Mark asked:

How do I reconcile a belief in certain moral absolutes that are incontrovertible so far as I am
concerned (e.g. I will neverkill someone, or if I did I would be crippled with guilt) with what experience
indicates is a world in which morality is wholly relative (e.g. perhaps in some circumstances it might
be necessary to kill innocent Serbs - for the sake of argument - for a greater good i.e. stopping other
Serbs killing Kosovans)?

This issue gets particularly wranglesome if one has faith in a particular religion - e.g. Christianity -
certain sects of which ultimately deny tolerance to other faiths yet the prevailing moral authority which
most of us would describe as a 'good' thing is to extend tolerance to others and, to borrow a well used
phrase, 'love thy neighbour as thyself'. Intellectually speaking, how would one fit both moral absolutes
and the flexibility of moral belief into a single coherent system which is neither rigidly totalitarian nor
anarchically lax?

Sorry about the length of this one - it is a bit of a thorny issue I suppose!

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First, we need to clear away a possible misunderstanding. The view that the right moral action is the
one that produces the 'greatest happiness for the greatest number' - as argued for in J.S. Mill's book
'Utilitarianism' - is an attempt to set up a single objective standard for right and wrong which stands
strictly opposed to relativism. Differences of opinion about which action is right can only concern the
factual question of which action will produce the best consequences, measured in terms of human
happiness.

Taken to its limit, utilitarianism advocates an extreme form of 'tolerance', where what is added up in
the utility calculation is not pleasure or happiness - the measurement of which is open to dispute - but
simply the satisfaction of preferences. The 'preference' utilitarian refrains from making any judgement
concerning whether the preferences expressed by different individuals are 'good' or 'bad', except
insofar as they conflict with the utilitarian principle itself.

I want to say that the utilitarians are right in holding that there is an objective, rational basis for moral
conduct but wrong in thinking that it entails a universally applicable formula that can be used to
decide every ethical question.

My own view is that the basis for moral conduct resides in the 'authority of the other'. I regard that
principle as the one 'moral absolute'. What I mean by that is that the judgements of others concerning
their needs and interests have necessary authority over my actions. So moral beliefs are not merely
'subjective'. But claims conflict. People want different things. Most importantly, the claims of some
persons have a higher authority for me than others. The claims of my wife and children, for example.

The result is an 'ethics of dialogue' in which we are duty bound to respect the claims of others. The
actions that follow, however, depend on a process of negotiation. Not every claim on me has equal
strength. It also follows that tolerance has its limits. For example, the abortionist and the
anti-abortionist cannot ask for toleration from one another. Yet they are still bound to respect one
another's right to exist. That is the precarious balance that has to be struck.

Geoffrey Klempner