Andrew asked:

Are morals, ethics, something that is hard-wired i.e. a priori? Are we born with a set of basic morals
and ethics or are they learned?

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There are really two questions here. The first question is whether our capacity for moral judgement is
'hard-wired', i.e. whether we are moral by 'nature' or by 'education'. The second question is whether
there is a rational, a priori justification for being moral. To see that these two questions are separate,
consider the following two cases:

1. Suppose it were true that morals are hard-wired. It is still open to an individual to raise the question
   whether it would not be better for them if they could find a way to free themselves of their biological
   conditioning.

2. Or suppose that there is an a priori philosophical argument that provides a rational basis for moral
   judgement. Even if our biology makes us naturally immoral, the rational thing to do in the face of that
   argument is curb our natural instincts and do what morality demands rather than what we naturally
   want.

Are morals 'hard wired'? Richard Dawkins in his book The Selfish Genegives a convincing
demonstration of the untenability of the theory that the survival of human society shows that human
beings must have 'evolved' a gene for altruism. The problem with that theory, as Dawkins points out,
is that the basis for the selection of one gene in favour of another is strictly its capacity to confer on
the individual a greater chance of surviving to procreate. Groups are not selected, only individuals
are.

Thus, if you put a ruthless user amongst a group of simple altruists, the user will survive at their
expense. On the other hand, a gene for 'bearing a grudge' or paying someone back in kind if they
don't scratch your back when you scratch theirs does have a potential to survive. Amongst one
another, the grudgers will behave altruistically. When a ruthless user comes along, they close ranks.

I don't think it follows from this that morals are merely conventional, as Dawkins seems to hold. I
would argue that respect for the other is learned as part of a natural process that starts in early
infancy. We learn to be moral as we learn language.

The natural dialogue of self and other as played out in the relation between the human infant and its
parent or carer is not sufficient, however, to establish an a priori basis for moral judgement. A
metaphysical argument is needed.

In my book Naive Metaphysics I try to give the metaphysical argument. I am not going to try to say
here whether I think that argument is successful. Intuitively, the idea is that if the other is not 'real' in
my eyes, if their needs and interests have no authority for me, then reality itself is not 'real'. A world
without moral values would be a world without 'truth' of any kind.

Geoffrey Klempner