Jake asked:

Can we ever truly live authentically as suggested by existentialism or are we always influenced by the
actions and reactions of others? If we believe anything of the theory of socialisation, surely this is
impossible?

Also my mate Sarah thinks that this is ponsey (she is probably right) and wants to know why
sometimes we have chips and other times we go without.

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I think that your mate Sarah may have hit on the right approach to answering your question.

Sometimes we fancy chips and sometimes we don't. The choice of chips or no chips is decided by the
desires and needs of the moment.

If someone says, 'I'm on a diet. I've stopped eating chips,' that's seems OK. They might fancy chips
some times, but not enough to risk ruining their figure. But suppose you point out to them, quite
reasonably, that eating a few chips on this single occasion isn't going to make a difference, when the
only alternative on the menu is something they really hate.

'But if I eat chips just once, I'll be motivated to break my diet.'

'Yes, but the reason you had for being on a diet in the first place won't be any different than it was
before.'

'Agreed. But as a result of eating chips once, I'll find it more difficult to resist eating them again.'

The question is whether someone who wants to be existentially authentic can say this. As you see,
the actions and reactions of others are not necessarily the problem.

The view others have of us is important. We prefer people to approve rather than disapprove. Let's
say I make a decision which someone whose opinion matters to me approves of. I can still be
existentially authentic, if my reason for doing what I did was solely that I judged it to be the right thing
to do in those particular circumstances. Naturally, I am glad to accept well-merited praise for my
decision.

I demonstrate the things I like or do not like, the things I want or do not want by the choices I make.
That is simple, 'authentic' decision making. Where inauthenticity comes in is where I allow 'the fact
that GK likes X', 'the fact that GK does not want Y' - either in my view, or the view of others - to
become considerations that motivate me. I may have liked X's in the past, but that doesn't mean I
have to like this particular X. I may have refused Y's in the past, but that doesn't mean I can't want
this particular Y.

Geoffrey Klempner