Jen asked:

I have a question about philosophy. My question is "Are philosophical questions about reality, or our
ideas of reality?" This question boggles my mind. If you can please help me, I would greatly
appreciate that.

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You are right, the question you have asked is mind boggling.

There is a philosophical tradition going back to Locke and Hume according to which the sole purpose
of philosophy is to analyse concepts or 'ideas'. In his Essay on Human UnderstandingLocke
describes the philosopher as an 'underlabourer sweeping away the rubbish that lies in the path of
knowledge'. In the closing paragraph of his Enquiry Concerning Human UnderstandingHume
presents a devastating dilemma - which has come to be known as 'Hume's Fork' - which says that the
only knowledge we can attain comes either from experience or from logical or mathematical
deduction. If we find that a book contains neither of these things we should 'Commit it then to the
flames: for it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion'.

The idea of conceptual analysis is the dominant paradigm today, though by and large philosophers
now prefer to talk of 'theories'. There is room for a kind of 'metaphysics' too, but what this entails is
largely the logical analysis of concepts like 'truth', 'existence', 'time', 'essence', 'necessity'. It is not the
kind of rationalist metaphysical theory that Hume set out to attack.

In these terms, there is room for lively debate whether the analyses produced are a response to
'questions about reality' or only about 'our ideas of reality'. I would say both. For example, a question
about the nature of causation is about the world of causes and effects, and also about our concept of
a 'cause'. By coming up with a workable analysis of the concept of causation, analytical philosophers
would say that they have discovered something we didn't know before about the world.

Or, alternatively, if you are interested in metaphysical systems of the past you can analyse the 'ideas
of reality' proposed by Spinoza, Berkeley, Kant or Leibniz. Then you can say, Yes, if one agrees to
certain premisses, say, about the nature of "space" or "experience" or "substance", then certain
conclusions follow.'

The deeper question is whether there might be something left over when all the logical analysis is
done, as I think there is. My interest in metaphysics is neither analytical nor historical. I share the faith
of the metaphysician that there are truths to discover about the ultimate nature of things. This isn't the
place to try to persuade you. However, I would point out that the end of metaphysics has been
advertised many times, and each time has proved to be a false alarm.

Geoffrey Klempner