David asked:

In a world where the determinist rationale rules, is freedom dead?

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This question isn't what it looks. You are not asking whether human beings can be free in a universe
where determinism holds, but rather about the 'determinist rationale', which is a quite different thing.
Whether determinism holds concerns how things are in reality, irrespective of our beliefs. Whether the
determinist rationale rules concerns our beliefs and attitudes. Let me explain.

If the universe is one in which determinism holds, then the following proposition is true. In a possible
universe which determinism holds, which is identical in every physical respect to the actual universe
up to the present moment, the action which my doppelganger in that universe does next is the same
as the action which I do next in this universe. Given that the laws of nature and the initial conditions
are the same, it is logically impossible for my doppelganger to do one thing and for me to do
something else. If my doppelganger turns left, then I must turn left. If my doppelganger turns right,
then I must turn right.

This seems to contradict the subjective experience of 'making a choice', where it appears, from my
subjective standpoint, that whether I shall do one action or another is open to be decided either way.
If I 'freely' do A in this universe, that implies that my doppelganger might not do A in the other
universe. The decision, whether to do A or not, ultimately depends on the moment, it is not merely the
determined result of what has gone before.

The view I have just sketched, however, is open to serious objections from philosophers, from David
Hume onwards, who take a compatibilistview of human freedom. The 'freedom' to do A, or not-A
which I have just described is not freedom at all but pure randomness. If my prior decision process
does not account for the choice that I make, then what happens at the moment can have nothing to
do with me, it cannot be anything I can take credit for. 'Free' action, correctly so called, results from
my externally unconstrained, rational choice. It is action that reflects my appreciation of the situation,
my character, my needs and desires. - That is not the last word by any means, but I am not going to
try to adjudicate on this debate.

A world where 'the determinist rationale rules' is a quite different situation. It need not even be a
universe where determinism holds. What is significant is that people widely believethat determinism
holds, and, what's more, this belief leads them via a fallacious inference to take a certain attitude
towards the explanation of human behaviour. A notorious example of this attitude would be the belief
that no-one deservespunishment. The institution of punishment is merely a way of appropriately
altering people's behaviour. Generally, persuasion and argument reduce to pushing and pulling
levers. It is a world where the concept of a 'person' ceases to have any significance, a world where
would be no such thing as human freedom.

It might seem paradoxical that the existence of a belief in unfreedom can be all that is required to
make that very belief true. In fact, the case is no different in principle from other cases of self-fulfilling
prophecies, for example, in the classroom, or on the stock market. Jimmy can't do his maths
homework because that's just what his prejudiced teacher expects. The shares in a company
plummet as a result of a respected analyst's prediction that the price will fall.

In short, the determinist rationale can never rule, so long as we refuse to grant it any credibility.

Geoffrey Klempner