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Gonzalo asked:
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I'm a student of International Relations in Argentina, and I'm also writing a thesis. My scheme is 'the
problem of qualia' and I would be so glad if you can give me some information about it.
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============
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I wonder what qualia have to do with international relations?
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'Quale' (plural 'qualia') is the name given to the subjective quality of conscious experiences, which is
held to be knowable only to the person whose conscious experience it is. I remember as a boy
wondering how I could be sure that what I called 'blue' was the same colour as what other people
called 'blue'. If we all subjectively experienced the colour of a clear sky differently it wouldn't matter so
long as we agreed what colour to call it. Similarly, the 'sharp pain' I feel when stabbed by a needle
might be the same or different from the 'sharp pain' other people feel when stabbed by a needle. That
doesn't matter, so long as we agree about the name.
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Doesn't it matter?
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If all that ultimately exists is physical matter, then there could be no room in the universe for qualia.
Some philosophers therefore consider the existence qualia to be a knock-down argument against
materialism. Materialism cannot be a true theory, they argue, so long as there is just one aspect of
the world that it cannot account for.
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My own view is that qualia do not exist. There are such things as 'sensations of blue' or 'sharp pains',
but these things do not satisfy the definition of a 'quale'. Nothing could satisfy that definition, because
the very idea of a quale is incoherent.
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Suppose, for the sake of reductio ad absurdum, that qualia do exist. My subjective experience of the
blue sky at this moment is a quale. I can agree with anyone who happens to be looking up at the
same sky that its colour is objectively blue. But no-one can ever know the 'blue' that I subjectively
know, the blue hidden away inside my own consciousness. Call it 'my blue'.
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The question is, Do I really know this? How can I be sure?
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In order to know that what is in my consciousness at this moment is 'my blue', it is necessary to be
sure that I am using the term 'my blue' consistently. The problem is I can only go by the way things
seem to me now, at this moment. If the 'I' that existed a few moments ago together will all my other
past 'I's subjectively experienced the colour of a clear sky differently it wouldn't matter so long as we
agreed what colour to call it. - You will notice that all I have done here is apply the very same
speculation about other people that I wondered about as a young boy to my own case. But in doing
so, I have revealed its intrinsic absurdity. Q.E.D.
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Geoffrey Klempner
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