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- Holder asked:
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Is Being a phenomenon?
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============
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Possibly.
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The question of the Being of the universe is not a question about something that lies behind the
phenomena. There is no world of Kantian 'things in themselves', forever beyond the reach of human
knowledge, known only to the Diety. Yet nor is the Being of the universe a meaningless question.
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Haven't I just exhausted the alternatives?
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I would argue that there may, possibly be a third alternative. I say 'possibly' because the jury is still
out. The question of the 'Being' of the universe concerns things, or 'beings' as a whole, as a totality.
The fundamental question of metaphysics is whether there could possibly be anything meaningful to
say about the universe as a whole, or as Aristotle put it, about 'Being qua Being'.
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If Being is a phenomenon, then there is something that metaphysical inquiry brings us to see. Being
can be made to 'appear'. Here is what I say in unit 1 of the Pathways metaphysics program The
Ultimate Nature of Things:
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Metaphysics is essentially transcendent. In attempting to break free from our immersion in mundane
things, however, as metaphysicians have traditionally sought to do, the contemporary metaphysician
no longer seeks a world of absolutes — purer, fairer, more 'necessary' than the transient world of
phenomena — but merely to increase the angle of view on our own familiar world. 'Defining reality' in
this relatively modest sense means stepping outside the mundane world (just one step would be
enough) in order to grasp it synoptically as a world, a reality, something that mind, or the 'I' stands in
relation to.
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Of course, this is a very abstract account of the problem. The only way I know how to make it more
concrete would be to tell you my theory. And I don't want my answer to your question about Being to
be contingent on the truth of my theory. (For an overview, see Naive Metaphysics, Chapter One.)
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In other words, I think it is more likely that my theory is wrong, than that I am wrong about the
possibility of 'stepping outside the mundane world' in order to gain a view of the phenomenon of
Being.
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Geoffrey Klempner
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