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Chris asked:

Does evolutionary psychology imply we have no free will?

============

Let's not beat about the bush. When people talk of 'evolutionary psychology' they are usually thinking
of sex.

Here's an illustrative example. Much fuss was made a while ago of research which claimed that there
were sound evolutionary reasons for female infidelity. Up until then, the received view had been that
according to the 'selfish gene' principle, the human male had the best chance of propagating his
genes if he had intercourse with as many females as possible, while the human female had the
greatest stake in maintaining a monogamous relationship, in order to give her children the best
chance for survival. The new research appeared to demonstrate that female monogamy is ideally
combined with opportunistic couplings with males who are perceived to possess superior genes.

Some people found this shocking. The fact that they were so shocked says a great deal about the
continuing hypocrisy of present day sexual attitudes.

The more thoughtful and less sexually biased observer might still find reason for disquietude. We
think of a decision to be unfaithful as a pre-eminent example of the exercise of free will. It turns out
that the unfaithful wife is responding blindly to the commands of her genes.

Now, it is always open to an opponent of free will to adopt the trumping tactic of claiming that every
deliberate human action, insofar as it is the end product of a chain of causes and effects, cannot be
described as truly 'free'. There are powerful counter moves against that argument, however. What we
are now concerned with is an additional reason for concern, based not on metaphysical dogma, but
on empirical research.

I am not convinced!

What are we really saying? Human beings have a nature. We inherit natural predispositions from our
genes. That is hardly surprising. It would, if anything, be a far greater cause for concern if it turned out
that human psychology is infinitely malleable. That there was no such thing, from the inside, as what
it is to be human. Then it would be completely up to us to make of ourselves what we will. What a
terrible burden that would impose!

It is truistic that it does not follow from the fact that human beings have a nature, that everything that
is 'natural' to us is desirable. Every responsible human parent — as I can testify from personal
experience — faces a battle against biological nature. (It was left to Freud to give this homely
observation a vicious twist in his late work Civilization and its Discontents.)

In short, to be in possession of a capacity for reason is to be capable of making choices. If we submit
to 'nature' then we are acting for a reason, which we may reflect upon and which others may praise or
criticize, no less than if we resist.

Geoffrey Klempner