Nick asked

I have often thought that given statistics and the knowledge that both the universe and time are
infinite, everything (and I mean EVERYthing) can be proven to either exist or have once existed.
Astronomers currently measure the universe at 15 billion light years, but that is only a measurement
of visible stars. They do not take into account the measure of space itself, which appears to be
limitless. Though time is measured at 15 billion years, that is just the start of the Big Bang. Scientists
tend to avoid the question of what came before, yet it would seem logical that something existed,
otherwise there would have been 'nothing' and absolute nothingness cannot spawn something.

My theory is that if nothingness can exist, then the universe can be finite and there can be a thing that
has never been anywhere at any time. But if nothingness cannot be, which I tend to believe,
everything has at some time and place existed. Although I must concede that from a pragmatic point
of view, due to the fact that human experience is finite, things that we will never experience is the
same as things never having existed. But from a philosophical point of view, I still think that every
book at Barnes & Nobles could be listed under non-fiction. In your opinion, is my thinking correct?

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I like this question, which fits in very nicely with the previous question, from James.

Your theory will not work as it stands, but the idea behind it is important. I'll explain that in a minute.
But let's first look at the theory. Your claim is that, given infinite time, every conceivable possibility
must necessarily be realized. Intuitively, this seems to make sense. If I close my eyes and make a dot
with my pen on a blank sheet of paper, then another, then another eventually there will be no empty
space left. Of course, it is logically possible that given any finite time, there will remain gaps. The
probability of there being gaps gets smaller and smaller as time goes on, never reaching zero. But if
time is infinite, then that probability becomes infinitely small.

However, that overlooks the following possibility. Suppose that the universe is governed by
deterministic laws. Given enough time, it is possiblethat exactly the same total configuration of
particles, forces, fields or whatever will be repeated. From that moment on, the history of the universe
will necessarily follow the exactly the same course as it followed from the previous time that the
universe was in that configuration. In other words, the history of the universe will effectively be caught
in a loop from which it can never escape.

This was the idea behind Nietzsche's doctrine of the Eternal Recurrence, which he revived from the
Greek Stoics.

In arguing for this theory, however, Nietzsche made the error of assuming that in a deterministic
universe the same configuration mustat some time be repeated. You can see this is wrong if you
consider a simple 'universe' consisting of three concentric discs of equal size, where discs A and B
revolve at a constant speed, relative to disc C, and where the ratio of the speed of the revolution of A
to the speed of B makes an irrational number (i.e. a number that cannot be expressed in the form of a
fraction n/m). Then if a point on the edge of disc A, coincides with points on disc B and on disc C at
any time, the three points will nevercoincide again, even given infinite time!

Nietzsche was wrong that the same configuration mustbe repeated. I am only saying that you cannot
rule outthe possibility that the same configuration will be repeated, resulting in an infinitely repeated
finite loop.

However, there is a way to salvage your idea. And that is to talk, not about things that will occur in
time, but rather about things that might have occurred, in some other logically possible world.
Philosophers who take a strongly realistview of possible worlds, such as David Lewis (see his books
Counterfactualsand On the Plurality of Worlds) claim that the only difference between the actual
world and other possible worlds is a difference of perspective. In other words, it is the same
difference as the difference between one time and another time, or one person and another person.
So the 'actual' world is just one possible perspective on the universe of all possible worlds, just as
'now' is one possible perspective on the history of the universe, or 'I' is one possible perspective on
the totality of self-conscious subjects.

The answer to, 'Why is there thisuniverse rather than some other possible universe?' is simply to
reject the assumption behind the question. This world does not exist rather thansome other possible
world, because all possible worlds are equally real.

However, you might have gathered from my response to James that I am not happy with this
argument. As someone who takes the question, 'Why is the person asking this question I?' seriously,
I do not consider it a satisfactory answer to be told, 'Every self-conscious subject is an "I", and you
are just one self-conscious subject amongst others.' In other words, if in reply to the question, 'Why is
there thisuniverse rather than some other possible universe?', one points out that the difference
between 'this universe' and 'another possible universe' is only a difference in perspective, then the
question becomes, 'Why is the world-perspective of the person asking the question this
world-perspective?

Geoffrey Klempner