R.E. Lee asked:

Does the Relativist negate relativism through his one inevitable premise that,

"There is noabsolute truth"

when such a claim expresses what is, to him an absolute truth? Or is this issue confused by linguistic
trickery? Or does such a premise, in the very least, force the relativist into treating as equal all other
opinions no matter how absurd? Or...?

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Relativism can be a useful way to interpret some aspects of the world, e.g. sociological and
psychological differences, and at the very least it promotes tolerance and respect for others.
However, extreme relativism, while it may initially sound plausible is in fact a kind of nonsense.

Why? because the relativism cannot be applied to itself. The claim that everything is relative, or that
"there is no absolute truth" has to be either objective or relative. But it cannot be objective since then
it would be false, and it cannot be relative for then it would not rule out the possibility of there being
any objective truths, including the claim that the statement "everything is relative" is objectively and
absolutely false.

Perhaps the relativist may reject this argument, claiming that my logic is only relative to my culture
and not in any position to criticise him, but then he is open to the same objection, for what privileged
position does the relativist hold that enables him to make such general and all-encompassing
statements?

This is a pretty simple argument and it is surprising how often it needs repeating, but not everything is
relative, although trying to draw the line that demarcates the objective from the subjective is one of
the hardest problems we have got.

Brian Tee
Dept of Philosophy
University of Sheffield.

Second opinion:

I disagree with Brian that relativism about truth is only involved in self-contradiction when taken in its
extreme form.

The claim that truth is relative would imply that there is a statement P, and persons A and B such
that:

(1) P has the same meaning for both person A and for person B.

(2) A believesthat P is true, and B believesthat not-P is true.

(3) A's belief in the truth of P istrue, so far as A is concerned, or relative to A.

(4) B's belief in the truth of not-P istrue so far as B is concerned, or relative to B.

Let there be just one statement P satisfying these requirements. That would be the most moderate
version of relativism about truth that could be considered. Anything less would not be relativism about
truth.

Now here comes the bit that R.E. Lee might call 'linguistic trickery'. In fact, it is a simple point about
the possible meanings that the term 'true' can have. The point is this. If someone makes a statement,
and you say, 'that's true', then you have effectively assertedthat statement yourself. You are
expressing your agreement with her claim, by making the very same claim. As the logician Alfred
Tarski observed, that is the one single, essential feature that marks a predicate 'is T' as being about
truthrather than being about something else.

As an illustration of this point, if, instead of saying 'that's true', you'd said, 'that's poetic', or 'that's
clever', or 'that's very well supported by the available evidence', then you would not be committed to
agreeing with what was said. A statement that is poetic, or clever, or very well supported by the
available evidence can still be false.

Now A says to me, 'I believe that P', and I say, 'That's true.' Then B says to me, 'I believe that not-P',
and again I say, 'That's true.' Then there are just two possibilities. Either I am contradicting myself, in
asserting both that P and not-P, or the meaning that I have attached to 'true' does not satisfy the one
essential feature that makes any predicate 'is T' a truth predicate.

To say that 'P is true so far as A is concerned' can only be to say that P believes that P. To say that
'not-P is true so far as B is concerned' can only be to say that B believes that not-P. The predicate 'is
true so far as A is concerned', or 'is true relative to A', or 'is true in A's world' is not a kind of truth. It
follows that even the most moderate version of relativism about truth is incoherent.

Geoffrey Klempner