Stephanie asked:

Is Peter Singer's extension of moral rights to animals compatible with A view like Kant's deontological
position? How could Singer's position be defended against a Kantian position?

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To argue that animals have rights because they have moral interests as individuals and have a basic
right to freedom from pain does not mean we have a Kantian duty to recognise such rights. Kant held
that we have a duty to humanity as rational beings. Rational beings act on will rather than instinct and
have the capacity to act in conformity with duty. If we can't extend these capacities to animals then
we can't have an unconditional moral duty towards them.

It would not be sufficient to claim that animals are actually rational and do act on instinct. Animals do
display behavioural characteristics indicative of practical reason, but this is not Kantian "pure reason".
He says "When reason is able to determine the will only by means of some further object of desire . . .
then it takes only a mediate interest in the action". While such empirical reason may be ascribed to
animals, we cannot claim they have an interest in the moral law. Animals cannot act on duty so
cannot be moral.

If animals are not part of our moral community, Kant would allow that we can treat them as means
and inflict pain upon them. If we don't do this it is because we don't have the desire to do so and Kant
would not regard it as moral if we are simply motivated to treat animals well because they suffer pain,
or because we can see them as individuals.

Singer's position is based upon moral feelings which are subjective. He argues from facts about
cruelty and this appeals to our conscience which is one way to morally ground the otherwise social or
political notions of justice and rights. The Kantian notion of duty doesn't have much hold these days in
competition with the idea of moral feeling. Also in defence of Singer you can argue for moral relativity
based upon cultural difference. Kant wanted an objective non-metaphysical basis for morality which is
not of concern to us today. Animals rights are important to us today, but weren't an issue in Kant's
time.

Rachel Browne