Adrienne asked:

What determines how we use moral rationalization? Example, the person who is released from jail,
knows or should know how to stay out of incarceration, yet they have a history of being a repeat
offender. The crime does not necessarily have to be the same offense.

============

This is the problem that was known in Greek philosophy as the problem of akrasiaor 'weakness of
will'. The problem is acute for any one who believes that we do the action which, in our view, we have
the best reasonto do.

In your example, the person released from jail knows that they oughtto stay out of trouble. It doesn't
matter whether one understands this as a moral 'ought' (the offender has learned the error of their
ways) or merely the recognition that they are not clever enough to avoid getting caught. Once out,
their resolve weakens and they offend again.

I prefer Socrates' solution to this problem to Aristotle's. For Socrates, 'weakness of will' is not the
correct description. The failure is a failure of reason and knowledge. If you reallyknew it was better
not offend again, then you wouldn't do it. When you do offend, it is because your knowledge deserts
you at the crucial moment. You get distracted from your goal. Aristotle didn't like this explanation. He
thought you could know you were doing the wrong thing by your lights, yet do it under the influence of
temptation. On such an occasion, your actions are controlled by your passions, not by your reason.

I cannot accept the idea that there are two distinct causes of our actions, our reasons and our
passions. Whatever we do, we do for a reason, even if it is a bad reason. The shoplifter who lusts
after a pair of designer jeans takes them for a reason which, in other circumstances would be
considered perfectly acceptable. I don't see how the desire for designer jeans can be a reason for
action on one occasion (when you can afford to pay for them) but not on another occasion. Of course,
there are reasons of various kinds for not shoplifting. These have to be taken into consideration. Yet,
at the crucial moment, the reasons for staying on the straight and narrow suddenly seem less
convincing. “Yes, I know it is wrong to steal. But I've got no money and it's wrong that other people
are rich and I am poor. And in any case, no-one is really going to suffer as a result of my action.” Or,
“I know I have been caught many times in the past, but practice makes perfect. This time, I am certain
I can get away with it!”

What I think Aristotle is absolutely right about is the crucial importance of habit.However, this can be
shoe horned neatly into the Socratic account. The ability to keep ones eyes fixed on an objective and
resisting the distractions of momentary temptation is something that can be strengthened or
weakened by habit. Thinking is an action just as much as doing. It would be absurd to claim that I
perform the mental action of choosing to consider a particular reason, only because I consciously
think about the reason for considering that reason. The result would be a vicious regress. In order to
consciously think about the reason for considering the first reason, I would have to think about the
reason for thinking about the second reason for considering the first reason, and so on.

The knowledge in which moral or prudential virtuein Socrates' sense consists, involves, above all, a
certain capacity for memory.It is memory that determines the reasons that occur to us at this or that
time, and how we respond to those perceived reasons. “The greatest curse of human beings,” as Max
von Sydow's Merlinremarks, “is that they forget!”

Geoffrey Klempner