Sergey asked:

What is Kant's idea of a "Kingdom of Ends"? How does the idea come out of previous formulations of
the "Categorical Imperative"? How is it different from Aristotle's idea of happiness, Hobbes's notion of
felicity or Mill's ultimate end of overall utility?

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Kant's ethical line of thought is developed along several parallel (and supposedly equivalent) lines.
The third formulation of the Categorical Imperative is known as the 'Formula of the End in Itself' and
runs as follows:

Act only according to that maxim which you can at the same time will that it should become a
universal moral law for every subject...subjects treated as ends — namely rational beings, and
never as a means.
The Groundwork for the Metaphysic of Morals.

The third formulation works as a check on the maxims we should adopt; rather than telling us to make
sure that our maxim would be adopted by all (formulations one and two), the third formulation
demands that we act in ways that respect and leave intact the ability of others to act on the maxims
that rational beings are bound to adopt. In the 'Kingdom of Ends' each rational being is both
'legislator' and 'legislated-to', autonomous on condition that what is legislated is respect for others' like
status as legislators. This is the self control that takes account of the like moral status of others.

Using another is to treat him as a tool and not a rational agent. Using another person as a means
rather than an end in himself is not simply doing something he doesn't want, but is to do something to
which he cannot give his consent. Promise breakers make it rationally impossible for the people they
try to deceive to consent to the promise-keeping project. The principles we must adopt, consequently,
if we are not to treat others as means are the principles of justice that are identified when we consider
which principles are universalisible for all rational beings.

The position is completely different from Aristotle's ethics, the proto-utilitarianism of Hobbes (and
Hume), and the utilitarian position of Mill. Kant does not judge moral worth by the happiness (felicity)
or utility that an act produces.

Consider Kant's own example of the honest grocer; a grocer who is honest because it is in his
interests to be honest does not act because he recognises honesty as a duty. He is honest because
he will keep customers happy and make more cash. To act morally would be to go on charging the
'right' amount even when it is in his interests not to do so. If he went against his own interests to
promote overall utility, still he would not be acting dutifully.

Equally, the philanthropist who is inclined to spread joy has no moral worth. His actions would be
moral if and only if he would act in the same manner when he felt no joy and was 'clouded with
sorrow', thus untouched by the troubles of others. So being philanthropic because it brings you
happiness is not to act morally either.

In fact the Kantian moral hero is the person of little sympathy; although 'cold and indifferent to the
suffering of others', he acts philanthropically because he recognises it a duty to do so. Duty presents
itself as obedience to a principle or law accessible and universally binding to all rational beings (which
another rational being would generate in similar circumstances) This is because the law is generated
by reason itself.

If the Kantian moral hero sounds more like the Aristotelian self-controlled man than a dutiful/ moral
person because he lacks the virtue of compassion, it is worth noting that in the Doctrine of Virtueof
1797 (The Metaphysic of Morals) Kant does admit that 'sympathetic feeling is generally a duty'.

Adam Gatward