Lydia asked:

In my philosophy class we are discussing the notion of Ethical Egoism. I am still confused as to how
Ethical Egoism differs from that of Psychological Egoism, and where is the line drawn — if it can
even exist. Maybe you can further explain for me!

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Psychological Egoism is a theory of human nature and human action, and states, roughly, that
humans always behave selfishly. Any action — even an apparently altruistic one — is explained in
terms of this theory. We act altruistically in order to be happy, or as a means to some other selfish
end. So it is a theory that maintains the impossibility of selfless acts or acts done purely for the sake
of the good. We only act, that is to say, when we are motivated by a desire to do so, and those
desires are always for our own good; any desire for the good of others is always explained, so the
theory goes, in terms of one of our own desires — what we want for ourselves. So it sounds as
though we are hopelessly bound by our nature and our desires to act selfishly and that we are unable
to act or be motivated by a reason (e.g. that x is good)

Ethical Egoism on the other hand is a moral theory as opposed to an account of human nature, and
states that we oughtto act selfishly, that the moral good consists in being selfish. As such it is distinct
from Psychological Egoism as one can be committed to Ethical Egoism while maintaining that we do
not always behave selfishly. One could also be a Psychological Egoist without being an Ethical Egoist
and deplore our selfish natures while thinking that we are powerless to do anything about it. As such
therefore, Ethical Egoism stands alongside utilitarianism (say) in putting forward a theory of what we
ought to do and of what the moral good consists in.

A weakness with the latter position is that it seems not to capture some important aspects of our
moral thinking — namely that (in our culture at least) moral goodness is often thought to consist in
putting others before ourselves. And equating what is desired with what is good is clearly not right as
one can desire things which are immoral.

As far as the former position goes, it is hopelessly weak for the reason that it tries to be a complete
theory of human action. That is to say that a psychological egoist seems committed to the position
that nobody has ever acted altruistically. Yet such a claim cannot be substantiated empirically and it
is also far from being true a priori.Furthermore, the position is unfalsifiable to the extent that all
evidence (even contrary evidence, such as a prima facie altruistic act for example) is used in favour
of the position. So the psychological egoist leaves no room for the idea of a non-egoistical act,
reducing the theory to meaninglessness.

Both positions can be refuted on further rational grounds too; following Thomas Nagel in The
Possibility of Altruism,the argument might go as follows.

Premise 1.For certain agent centred reasons there are corresponding non-agent relative reasons.

(e.g.) My thinking in wanting to get rid of my tiresome headache is supported by thinking 'what is so
bad about headaches' to which I reply 'it is a painful condition, and it is undesirable to be in pain'.

Premise 2.The fact that one's own condition can move one and that others can be in the same
condition as me is sufficient to show that I can be moved by the conditions of others.

Therefore, unless you are a solipsist (who denies that others can be in the same condition as oneself)
it is possible to be selfless and this is therefore a requirement of rationality.

This argument, in my view, is one of several knockdown ones against those who are skeptical about
the possibility of unselfish action.

Adam Gatward

Psychological egoism is pure self-interested egoism and cannot be ethical. To act purely from
self-interest is to act in a way most beneficial to oneself without any consideration for the interests of
others. It is possible for a psychological egoist to take others' interests into account if this is at the
same time to promote his own interests but he will not act simply for others.

Even when the pure egoist appears to care passionately, his feelings will not really be other-directed.
R. Gaita points out in Good and Evil: An Absolute Conceptionthat one might love someone so much
that one is willing to die for them. This would not make the pure egoist an ethical person. For sure,
the egoist would derive no personal benefit. However, this is egocentric insofar as it purely based on
feeling. Once love has ceased, the egoist will no longer be willing to die for the other person, so it was
not properly in consideration of the other person that he was willing to die in the first place.

Oddly, the ethical egoist cannot act according to feelings. The ethical egoist differs from the pure
egoist in that he is able to recognise a duty towards others and act upon it. According to Bernard
Williams in Ethics and the Limits of Philosophy,ethical egoism issues from the general position of
recognizing that it is in everyone's interest that each person acts in his own self-interest. This
introduces an ethical obligation insofar as it provides a reason to promote the interests of everyone.

In failing to recognise obligations towards others, the ethical egoist becomes a psychological egoist.
Likewise, if he acts according to non-moral feelings such as love.

It is widely thought that ethical actions can never be egoistic because egoism is incompatible with
dispositional moral attitudes such as benevolence, altruism and virtue and hence ethical egoism is
incoherent. Whether or not this is the case, the notion of duty is an ethical concept which determines
the difference between egoism as psychological and egoism which allows the possibility of acting on
others' interests.

Rachel Browne