Jasper asked:

Gentlemen, my question is of a difficult nature, but one which philosophers have been wrongly
charged with neglect over by certain individuals in countries with little tolerance and a large bill of
rights at the cost of others.

The question is, "Are persons who suffer from Multiple Personality Disorder and other disassociative
ailments culpable for illicit behaviour if an individual agent acts without the primary agent's (whichever
one that means) knowledge?" Now I am talking murder here, gentlemen! And this is no game!

I'd ask those who tackle this question to consider:

*
Are or do MPD suffers defined as beholding of solo personness, although other individuals compete
within the same mind/ body for differing states of consciousness/being?

*
If they are not culpable for their actions, in what ways does or should similar altered states be
acknowledged as innocent before the eyes of the law?

This is not really a philosophical question, but one of jurisprudence, which I will attempt to answer
from the point of view of courts in early 19th century England, since there seems to have been a
clearer consensus on the legal definition of insanity and how it applied to culpability than is the case
today.

The question hinges on whether the person is sufficiently in his right mind to understand the
consequences of his actions and to know the difference between right and wrong. A person can be
quite irrational and still be aware of the consequences of what he is doing. Suppose I believe I am
Napoleon, despite all the objective evidence to the contrary, and perform some action while I am
suffering from this delusion. Am I responsible for it? Yes — it was still my mind and my body which
performed the action, and therefore, my mind and my body are the only ones which can be held
accountable, even though the unquiet shade of Napoleon might be considered to have temporarily
taken over. Conversely, if I were to make a significant scientific discovery while believing myself to be
Napoleon, I would not regard this as a reason to omit the discovery from consideration in promotion
and tenure cases.

Multiple personalities are commoner than is generally realized; they tend to attract notice only when
one of the personalities is seriously antisocial. Everyone, at some level, has several selves, and the
'true' one may not be the same in all contexts.

Martha Sherwood (not currently Napoleon)
Ecology and Evolution Program
University of Oregon

There is a difference between culpability and responsibility. In the eyes of the law the physical person
is recognised as culpable which is necessary for the protection of the public. If the physical person
has more than one persona it can be recognised that only one of these is responsible. To an extent,
English law makes allowance for a condition such as MPD.

To intend the death of a person and to carry out the act is to have full responsibility and to be
culpable in the eyes of the law for murder. If a person's action results in the death of another it is only
classed as murder if it is intended. A person suffering from MPD may claim that death was intended
by one persona, while another persona was innocent. This would be to make use of a defence of
diminished responsibility, i.e. the law recognises that such a person cannot be held fully responsible.
However, because the law must protect the public from actions of the physical person, the sufferer
will still be subject to a lesser charge of manslaughter.

Rachel Browne